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Abstract 
 
The aim of this paper is to analyse the doctrine of direct effect, which have 
been a subject of debate and controversy for more than four decades, still 
preoccupies European minds. As is well known, the ECJ set out the main 
principles of doctrine through the Van Gend en Loos case. In this significant 
case, the Court held Community law directly effective and thus creating 
rights for individuals that are enforceable before national courts. The 
existence of direct effect, which affects both the member-states and their 
citizens, resulted in remarkable changes in the evolution of the Community 
law. Not only the meaning of direct effect doctrine but also to determine 
whether provisions of a Community directive are capable of producing 
direct effect, if so to what extent is a question that results in severe 
discussions among the scholars for a long period of time. In addition to 
those complexities, different perceptions of the member-states have led to 
conceptual confusions. The question whether the existence of individual 
rights has something to do with the conditions of direct effect is one other 
issue that has been the focus of discussions among different point of views. 
This debate results in the separation between ‘subjective’ direct effect and 
‘objective’ direct effect. Such a study will be useful in analysing the 
distinction between ‘subjective’ direct effect and ‘objective’ direct effect; 
and to understand the logical background of this distinction. In other words, 
how this distinction reflected in different articles? This study also seeks to 
investigate whether the existence of individual rights is a precondition for a 
directive to be capable of direct effect. Another crucial question that has to 
be evaluated is whether the existence of direct effect doctrine, which is 
diluted by the different perceptions, is an obstacle to the development of 
Community law.      
 
Bu çalışmanın amacı kırk yılı aşkın bir süredir Avrupa’da tartışma konusu 
olan doğrudan etki doktrininin analiz edilmesidir. Doktrinin temel ilkeleri 
ve ön koşulları Van Gend en Loos adlı davada belirlenmiştir. Avrupa Adalet 
Divanı bu davada verdiği kararla Topluluk Hukukunun doğrudan etkisini 
kâbul etmiş ve AB vatandaşlarına haklar verdiğini belirlemiştir. Bireyler söz 
konusu haklara dayanarak ulusal mahkemeler önünde haklarını 
savunabilirler. Doğrudan etki doktrininin üzerinde fikir birliğine varılmış bir 
tanımlaması yoktur. ‘Hak’ kavramının doğrudan etkinin varlığı için bir ön 
koşul olup olmadığı hâlâ bir tartışma konusudur. Kimileri doğrudan etkinin 
olabilmesi için AB hükümlerinin bireylere ‘hak’ vermesinin bir ön koşul 
olduğunu savunurken, diğerleri bunun gerekli olmadığını Van Gend en 
Loos’ta belirlenen kriterlerin gerçekleşmesinin doğrudan etkinin kâbulu için 
yeterli olacağını savunmaktadırlar. Bu tartışma sübjektif doğrudan etki ve 
objektif doğrudan etki ayrımını da beraberinde getirmiştir.            
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1. Introduction 
 
irect effect refers to the principle that enables the citizens of the 
member-states to enforce the European Community law [hereinafter 
Community law or EC law] before their national courts. Although direct 
effect has never been mentioned in the Treaties that establish the 
Community, it now applies to most pieces of European legislation. The legal 
background of the term was first established by the European Court of 
Justice [hereinafter ECJ or the Court] through the judgement in the Van 
Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen (Case 26/62, 
[1963] ECR 1). In Van Gend en Loos (Case 26/62) the ECJ held one of its 
most significant decisions which resulted in remarkable developments in the 
Community law. The Court announced the Community law directly 
effective, certain provisions of EC law may confer rights or impose 
obligations on individuals that national courts had to recognise and enforce.  
D 
The ECJ established the criteria for a Community provision to 
produce direct effect in the Van Gend en Loos (Case 26/62). For a provision 
of the Treaty to be directly effective three conditions must be fulfilled. 
These three conditions are commonly known as Van Gend en Loos criteria.  
The provision concerned must be sufficiently clear and precisely stated; it 
must be unconditional or non-dependent; and the provision should be self-
executing (no further implementing measures are necessary). Only the 
satisfaction of these three criteria enables the EC citizens to invoke 
Community law before their national courts. 
In Van Gend en Loos (Case 26/62) the ECJ held that an individual 
may rely on EC law against the state if the latter violates the rights of the 
former. However, the question on the violation of an individual right by 
another individual remained unanswered. Could individuals be able to 
protect their rights against another private party before the national courts? 
Van Gend en Loos (Case 26/62), which set out the main principles of direct 
effect doctrine, resulted in incredible changes in the evolution of the 
Community law concerning the direct effect doctrine. However, this 
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judgement of the ECJ was not the only one that broadened the concept of 
direct effect. The ECJ has eventually strengthened and extended the scope 
of direct effect doctrine in its subsequent judgements. In Gabrielle Defrenne 
v. SABENA (Case 43/75, [1976] ECR 631), the ECJ defined two different 
varieties of direct effect. Those were vertical direct effect and horizontal 
direct effect. The distinction between vertical direct effect and horizontal 
direct effect was based on to whom the right is to be enforced.  
Vertical direct effect refers to the principle where EC citizens invoke 
the Community law against the state. In this regard, the principle of vertical 
direct effect indicates the relationship between EC law and domestic law of 
the member-states that are obliged to comply with the Community law. 
Since vertical direct effect is related to the relationship between the state 
and the individuals, it is important to figure out whether a body concerned 
could be considered an emanation of the state. In Foster and Others v. 
British Gas (Case C-188/89 [1990] ECR I-33/3), the ECJ made a wide 
definition of state and provided a definition of an emanation of a state.  
 
“… whatever its legal form, which has been made 
responsible pursuant to a measure adopted by a public authority, 
for providing a public service under the control of that authority 
and has for that purpose special powers beyond those which result 
from the normal rules applicable in relations between 
individuals.”(Templeman & Kaczorowska 2000: 142). 
 
As Templeman and Kaczorowska indicate, “it results from that definition 
that three criteria should be satisfied in order to consider an organisation as 
an emanation of the State.” (2000: 142). The body that is accepted as an 
emanation of a state must be entitled for providing a public service. This 
public service must be provided under the control of the state. Finally, this 
body must have special powers beyond those which result from the normal 
rules applicable in relations between individuals, to provide that service 
(Templeman & Kaczorowska 2000: 142).  
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 Horizontal liability, between private parties, for breach of the 
Community law, refers to another principle: Horizontal direct effect. If a 
Community provision is horizontally directly effective, an individual 
(including private companies) could rely on it against another individual. In 
Gabrielle Defrenne v. SABENA (Case 43/75) the ECJ established that some 
provisions of the Treaty may produce horizontal direct effect1. This case 
was related to the Article 141 (ex 119) EC that prohibits all the 
discrimination between men and women workers. This case of the ECJ 
established that the some provisions of the EC Treaty were not only 
enforceable against the actions of the state or an emanation of the state, but 
also they are applicable to the relationships between individuals, therefore 
capable of producing horizontal direct effect.     
However, since a provision of a directive may not impose 
obligations on an individual, an individual against another individual may 
not rely on it. Regulations, which are directly applicable in all member-
states, and certain provisions of the Community law, on the other hand, are 
capable of producing horizontal direct effect. For example, in Courage Ltd. 
v. Bernard Crehan and Bernard Crehan v. Courage Ltd. and Others (Case 
C-453/99) the ECJ held that “Article 85 (1) of the Treaty  and Article 86 of 
the EC Treaty (now Article 82 EC) produce direct effect in relations 
between individuals and create rights for the individuals concerned which 
the national courts must safeguard.”  
 Direct effect doctrine of EC law is a very ambiguous legal concept 
since it covers almost every field of the Community law including the 
Treaties of Community/Union, secondary legislation, and even international 
agreements. In other words, it relates to all binding Community law 
including regulations, decisions and directives. Regulations are most 
commonly directly applicable since they are incapable of being conditional. 
Unlike regulations, the situation of the Community directives is not so clear. 
 
1 They are the case-law of the ECJ that determine the certain provisions that produce both 
vertical direct effect and horizontal direct effect. Some of these Treaty articles are Article 
119 EC that specifies the competition policy, Article 6 EC relating the discrimination based 
on nationality and certain articles relating the free movement of  workers and self-
employed.  
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Directives are binding as to the objectives to be achieved. Moreover, 
directives are binding only in those member-states to whom they are 
addressed. Finally, the legislative body of the member-state concerned must 
implement a directive that is addressed to it. Directives may not produce 
horizontal direct effect because they are only enforceable against the state or 
an emanation of a state.  
 On the other hand, since directives are capable of imposing 
obligations on member-states, they may produce vertical direct effect if the 
state concerned fails to implement the measure after the time limit for their 
implementation has expired. Nevertheless, member-states are free to choose 
the method and the actual implementation of the directive. In Grad v. 
Finanzamt Traunstein (Case 9/70 [1970] ECR-825) and in Becker v. 
Finanzamt Munster-Innenstadt (Case 8/81 [1982] ECR 53), the ECJ held 
that a directive might produce direct effect when it imposes an obligation to 
the member-state concerned to achieve a required result within the 
prescribed period. However, the state that fails to implement the related 
provisions of a directive within the prescribed period may not take 
advantage of its own failure to perform the directive obligations or to 
comply with the Community law. On the grounds of these judgements, it is 
true to say that unconditional and sufficiently precise conditions of a 
Community directive could be relied on by individuals against the state or 
an emanation of a state2. Still, the fulfilment of the Van Gend en Loos 
criteria is the key for any Community directive to produce direct effect.   
 Moreover, if there is a conflicting measure in domestic law, 
member-state may not apply its internal law that is not in conformity with 
the Community law. At the same token, unimplemented measures of a 
Community directive may not be invoked by a state in a proceeding against 
an individual. Nevertheless, if the time limit given to the member-state has 
not expired a directive is incapable of producing direct effect. In Pubblico 
 
2 As stated in the judgement of the Foster and Others v. British Gas (Case 188/89), 
provisions of a directive is applicable against public bodies such as tax authorities, local or 
regional authorities, constitutionally independent authorities responsible for the 
maintanence of public order and safety, and public authorities providing public health 
services.  
                                                                            
                                                                                           5
 
 
Ministero v. Ratti (Case 148/78 [1979] ECR 1629) the ECJ held that “[…] if 
the time-limit for implementation into national law had not been reached at 
the relevant time, the obligation was not directly effective.” (Templeman & 
Kaczorowska 2000:146).  
 On the other hand, the ECJ developed a number of mechanisms for 
giving more effect to EC directives prior to time limit for implementation of 
a directive. National courts have been obliged to interpret the domestic law 
in conformity with the EC directive. This is called “the indirect effect” of 
Community law. Even though the domestic governments are free to draft 
their own implementation method, this method or the domestic 
implementing law has to comply with the aims of a directive. 
 In Von Colson and Kamann v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen (Case 
14/83 [1984] and Harz v. Deutsche Tradax GmbH (Case 79/83 [1984] ECR 
1921) the ECJ held that “[…] national law must be interpreted in such a way 
as to achieve the result required by the Directive regardless of whether the 
defendant was the State or a private party.” (Templeman & Kaczorowska 
2000:152). The judgement in these two cases offered a new solution for the 
non-existence of the horizontal direct effect of the directives. Since 
directives are incapable of producing horizontal liability, they cannot be 
relied on by an individual against another individual. By producing indirect 
effect, the ECJ provided a new system: National judges are obliged to 
interpret the national law in the light of a Community directive concerned. 
A logical comparison to this principle is that although time limit for a 
directive is not expired, the national courts may interpret the national laws 
in the spirit of the wording of a Community directive.               
Direct effect doctrine is not only a complex phrase, but also it is 
imprecise; the meaning of the doctrine remains vague. As Craig and de 
Búrca (2003) indicate, “academic and even judicial uncertainty remains 
about the exact meaning and scope of the term” (179). However, the 
concept can be evaluated and defined within two dependent meanings: 
namely, narrower (traditional) and the broader (modern) definitions. 
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First, since it is connected to the individuals, in order to be relied on 
by individuals before national courts, a provision must ‘confer rights on 
individuals’. This, conferring rights on individuals test, is the ‘narrower 
definition’ of the direct effect doctrine. The traditional meaning of the 
direct effect doctrine is first set through the mediation of Van Gend en Loos 
judgement. 
Second, it is necessary to explain the meaning of the doctrine by 
focusing on the ‘broader meaning’ of it. In its simplest sense, when the 
provisions of Community law are sufficiently precise and unconditional, a 
private individual may rely on them before the national courts of the 
member-states. 
This study will aim to show that the provisions of Community law 
are sometimes capable of having direct effect and other times incapable of 
producing it. Some scholars strongly link the direct effect with the existence 
of individual rights and others indicate that former could only be the 
consequence of the latter. This study analyses the evolution of the direct 
effect doctrine in the light of individual concern in order to investigate 
whether the existence of individual rights is a precondition for Community 
directives to produce direct effect. Although most of the scholars in 
common law countries have argued that the existence of individual right is a 
precondition for a directive to be directly effective, relatively new case law 
of the ECJ demonstrate that the individual concern is not a precondition but 
a consequence.  
Secondly, it is in that perspective that this paper wishes to examine 
the renewed discussions on direct effect doctrine in the framework of 
studies given by Prechal (1996, 1998, 2000, 2006), Van Gerven (2000), de 
Witte (1999) and Coppel (1994). Although the existence of direct effect 
doctrine induces the application of Community law in the member-states, 
closer examination shows that national judges are able to escape the 
application of Community law through the mediation of direct effect 
doctrine by disapplying it. However, in a community where rule of law is 
enhanced, there is no need for such vague concept. The direct effect doctrine 
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seems to be an obstacle to the development of Community law as a ‘law of 
the land’ of the member-states. Later, the paper will focus mostly on the 
obsolete character of the direct effect doctrine in a new era where 
interdependencies among member-states increase dramatically and where 
rule of law reigns.       
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2. Evolution of the Direct Effect of Community Law 
 
2.1. General Conditions for Community Law to Produce Direct Effect 
 
egal integration, effectiveness and uniform application of the 
Community law throughout the member-states are among the aims of 
the ECJ. However, the provisions of the EC Treaty may not be designed for 
immediate application of the member-states. It is almost impossible for the 
national courts to apply all EC provisions uniformly. Application of a 
Community provision may lead to different results in different member-
states. In order to realize the uniform application of the EC law and because 
of these concerns above, the general conditions for Community law to 
produce direct effect were set.  The specific conditions on direct effect have 
first provided by the ECJ through the mediation of its early decision on the 
Van Gend en Loos (Case 26/62).  
L 
The central point of the case was whether private parties could rely 
on Community law against national authorities before national courts. To 
put it another way; whether Article 25 (ex 12) EC, which prevents member-
states introducing new customs duties on imports or exports or any charges 
having equivalent effect, and increasing existing duties in trade, produced 
direct effect.   
 Many voices would claim Article 25 (ex12) EC was aimed at 
member-states and could not be relied upon by private parties before a 
national court since so called provision did not grant any rights to them but 
only imposed an obligation to member-states. In other words, Article 25 (ex 
12) EC was not conferring rights on individuals to import goods from other 
member-states free from customs duties. Therefore, Article 25 (ex 12) could 
not be considered as having direct effect. The ECJ, on the other hand, did 
not recognize the applicability of this definition and set out specific 
standards for direct effect. Direct effect of a provision could not be denied 
just because it is merely addressed to member-states. Specifically, a 
provision of EC provides direct effect if it meets several conditions.  
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 However, before focusing on those conditions set out by the ECJ, it 
is necessary to understand the path followed by the Court during the course 
of the Van Gend en Loos case. Hartley’s 1998 study explains the Court’s 
first reaction to this case as below: 
 
The wording of Article 12 contains a clear and unconditional 
prohibition which is not a positive but a negative obligation. This 
obligation, moreover, is not qualified by any reservation on the part 
of states that would make its implementation conditional upon a 
positive legislative measure enacted under national law. The very 
nature of this prohibition makes it ideally adapted to produce direct 
effects in the legal relationship between Member States and their 
subjects (191).    
 
The Van Gend en Loos criteria are the modified version of this statement 
above. As Hartley (1998) indicates negative obligations (prohibitions), 
which the Court recognised as the only directly effective part of the article, 
have been amended. In order to have a direct effect, the provision of the 
Community law must be sufficiently precise and unconditional.  
    
2.1.1. Sufficiently Precise and Clear 
 
he content of the Community provisions, which member-states are 
obliged to adhere to, has to be clear and precise before they can 
produce direct effect. If a provision of a Community is clear and precise 
enough it can be relied on by individuals before national courts. Moreover, 
precision of a provision made it operational to be applied by a national 
court. Fundamentally, these are the intended purposes of almost all legal 
provisions. Yet it is not an easy task to perform; it is more complicated 
within the Community where a number of conflicting interests collide 
among different member-states. 
T 
 In its judgement on 23 February 1994 in Comitato di Coordinamento 
per la Difesa dela Cavaand others v Regione Lombardia and others (Case 
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C-236/92 [1994] ECR 1) the Court defines what it meant by sufficiently 
precise by saying: “…a Community provision…is sufficiently precise to be 
relied on by an individual and applied by the court where the obligation 
which it imposes is set out in ‘unequivocal terms.’ The Lombardia case 
was on the interpretation of Council Directive 75/442/EEC of 15 July 1975 
on waste. According to Article 4 of the Directive 75/442, member-states 
shall take all necessary measures to prevent the disposal of waste 
endangering human health and to harm environment. Directive 75/442 
determines neither the specific measure, nor does it set out a method of 
waste disposal. Therefore, it is not sufficiently precise to produce a direct 
effect, so cannot be relied upon by individuals against a member-state 
before a national court.  
 Pescatore’s (1983 qtd. in Weatherill & Beaumont, 1999) view is that 
“the requirement to be sufficiently precise is fulfilled if the provision of 
Community law furnishes ‘workable indications’ to the national court” 
(395). In Defrenne v. SABENA (Case 43/75) the ECJ determined which part 
of Article 141 (ex 119) EC produce direct effect by making a distinction 
between “first, direct and overt discrimination which may be identified 
solely with the aid of the criteria based on equal work and equal pay and, 
secondly, indirect and disguised discrimination which can only be identified 
by reference to more explicit implementing provisions of a Community or 
national character”. (Templeman & Kaczorowska 2000: 137). The ECJ held 
that the first one was directly effective since it is sufficiently precise to be 
identified by the national courts. In other words, the wording of the directive 
concerned was providing workable indications to the national courts. The 
second one, on the other hand was failed to be directly effective because it 
was not sufficiently precise.  
Direct and overt discrimination is sufficiently precise because it 
occurs when the man and the woman paid unevenly for the same job. 
Indirect and disguised discrimination, on the other hand, is less 
straightforward to determine. It can occur when a man earns more than a 
woman for a work of equal concerning jobs which are different in nature.           
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However, Hartley (1998) signifies that the ECJ is there when a 
Community condition is needed to be clarified. That is to say, Community 
provision could be directly effective even if the wording of it is unclear and 
not precise; the Court is obliged to interpret the provisions whose 
interpretation cause difficulties. As in many legal documents, the wording 
of the Community provisions are quite complex. However, the complexity 
of a provision is not necessarily an obstacle to the provision to have direct 
effect.    
 Hartley (1998) indicates, “Since the ECJ’s interpretation will resolve 
the ambiguity question, generality and lack of precision would always be 
the genuine questions to be discussed” (192). Community provision could 
be vague; it could have a general intention and give no clues on reaching the 
desired purpose within the provision itself after all. Craig and de Búrca 
(1999) propose that “if a provision is vague, e.g. it sets out only a very 
general aim which needs further implementing measures to be made 
concrete and clear, then it is difficult to accord direct effect to that provision 
and allow its direct application by a national court” (168). The Union’s 
economic policy is a vague purpose, therefore not sufficiently precise to 
produce direct effect. Hartley’s 1998 study shows that Article 10 (ex 5) of 
the Treaty as a relevant example of such a provision as follows:  
 
Member-states shall take all appropriate measures, whether 
general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising 
out of this Treaty or resulting from action taken by the institutions of 
the Community. They shall facilitate the achievement of the 
Community’s tasks. They shall abstain from any measure which 
could jeopardise the attainment of the objectives of this Treaty (192).  
 
Article 10 (ex 5) EC itself is only the expression of the more general rule 
imposing on member-states and the Community institutions mutual duties of 
genuine cooperation and assistance. Therefore, it is not directly effective by 
itself, on the other hand, it could still produce direct effect when combined 
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with another Community provision3. Alternatively, if a provision accurately 
imposes obligations on the nationals of a member-state, the provision is 
precise. Conversely, if a provision gives rights to individuals against the 
national authorities, the precision of the provision would be limited.  
 
2.1.2. Unconditional 
 
n Lombardia (Case C-236/92) the criteria for unconditional provision is 
defined by the ECJ;  
 
I 
“[…] a Community provision is unconditional where it is not 
subject, in its implementation or effects, to the taking of any measure 
either by the institutions of the Community or by the Member States 
[…]” 
 
A logical corollary to this quotation is that, a Community provision is said 
to be conditional when it is under the discretion of an independent body, 
such as a Community institution or an administrative authority of a member-
state. If this is the case, it cannot produce a reliable direct effect.  
As indicated by Hartley (1998: 193-195) and Weatherill and 
Beumont (1999: 393-394); through the mediation of Community provisions 
on state aid, unconditionality principle can be defined accurately, since state 
aid involves institutional interference. Indeed, as said in Fédération 
Nationale du Commerce Extérieur des Produits Alimentaires and Syndicat 
National des Négociants et Transformateurs de Saumon v French Republic 
(Case 354/90, [1991] ECR 1-5505), the Commission is entitled to determine 
the compatibility of state aid to the common market under Article 87 (ex 92) 
EC. It is also subjected to the supervision of the ECJ. This article is 
dependent on the judgement and is subjected to the discretion of 
 
3 Hartley also says that Article 10 (ex. 5) EC combining with another Community provision 
may produce a direct effect, if the wording of the latter is precise enough. However, in 
some cases Article 10 (ex.5) may fail to produce direct effect even if it combines with 
another article. In Hurd v. Jones (Case 44/84, [1986] ECR 29) the Court held that Article 3 
of the Act concerning the conditions of accession of UK, Denmark and Ireland to the EEC 
produces no direct effect since it is not clear and unconditional and not contingent on any 
discretionary implementing measure.      
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Community institutions; Therefore, Article 87 (ex 92) is not directly 
effective.      
State aid distorts trade among member-states because it favours 
selected enterprises or their certain products against the others competing 
within the same market. Indeed, state aid is declared incompatible with the 
common market under Article 87(1) {ex 92(1)} EC where it affects trade 
between member-states. However, there are some exceptions set out by the 
provisions of the same article. Under these circumstances, one might think 
that Article 87 (ex 92) EC is clear enough to produce direct effect. Yet 
Hartley (1998) indicates that it is not directly effective since European 
Commission is obliged to determine whether the state aid affects the trade 
between member-states under Article 88(2) {ex 93(2)} EC. The 
Commission may ask the member-state to terminate the state aid within a 
given time period if it decides the so-called aid is infringing the provisions 
of Article 87 (ex 92). The Council is also allowed to approve any aid 
compatible with the common market; and if the Council were asked whether 
the proposed aid was compatible to the common market, a proceeding given 
by the Commission would have been suspended. In the light of these above 
conditions, it is fair to say that Article 87 (ex 92) does not provide direct 
effect since it is conditional – restricted to the decisions taken by the 
European institutions.  
Weatherill and Beaumont (1999) on the other hand, put the emphasis 
on the last sentence of Article 88(3) {ex 93(3)} EC through which national 
courts are given a limited role to play. It is worded as follows:   
 
The Commission shall be informed, in sufficient time to 
enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid. If 
it considers that any such plan is not compatible with the common 
market having regard to Article 87, it shall without delay initiate the 
procedure provided for in paragraph 2. The Member State concerned 
shall not put its proposed measures into effect until this procedure 
has resulted in a final decision.   
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In fact, it is really not only the duty of the Community institutions to decide 
whether state aid is compatible with the common market. In addition, it is 
the duty for, having regard to the direct effect that the last sentence of 
Article 88(3) {ex 93(3)} EC has been held to have, the national courts (Case 
354/90, [1991] ECR 1-5505). Yet as explained previously the role of the 
Commission is fundamentally different from the national courts. The 
Commission itself is responsible for examining the compatibility of the state 
aid with the common market; whereas, national courts are there just to 
preserve the individuals’ rights who may be faced with an infringement 
resulting the act of state authorities; after all, this limited role given to the 
national courts does create direct effect.  Above all else, one must be aware 
of the fact that a provision might be directly effective even though the 
directive itself failed to create direct effect.  
 Nevertheless, a provision of a Community law may produce direct 
effect even if it seems that it is under the discretion of an independent 
authority. In order to be directly effective the given discretion on the 
proposed provision (which is conditional since it is subjected to the control 
of an independent body) has to be dependent upon to the judicial control of 
a court. Hartley (1998) and Weatherill and Beaumont (1999) illustrate this 
statement through early Van Duyn v Home Office4 (Case 41/74, [1974] ECR 
1337). In this case, the ECJ ruled that Article 39 (ex 48) was capable of 
having direct effect. The ECJ appeared to determine that the Community 
law may be relied upon by individuals to challenge the discrimination on 
 
4 The ECJ decided that the Article 39 (ex 48) of the Treaty is directly effective within this 
case. The case begins with the denial of a Dutch woman, who is the member of a marginal 
religious group called the Church of Scientology, to enter the UK. The group itself was 
neither banned nor was its members put in jail. Instead, national authorities in the UK 
defined it harmful to the mental health and showed their disapproval to this religious 
community. As a consequence of this strong disapproval, the UK government takes all 
‘necessary’ measures against the members. One of the outcomes was refusing to allow a 
Dutch woman to enter the country, who previously had taken up a post within this marginal 
group. This decision was challenged before the English courts by the Dutch woman. The 
direct effect of Article 39 (ex 48), which is concerned the free movement, was one of issues 
appeared before the national court. The question was whether Article 39 (ex 48) produces 
direct effect. The ECJ decided that the proposed article is directly effective even though it 
seems to be conditional on the grounds that the application of the limitations is subject to 
judicial control. To put it another way, the government’s decision to put limitations on free 
movement on the grounds of public policy, public health or public security was subjected to 
the judicial control that’s why the ECJ did not refuse the direct effect of Article 39 (ex 48).                     
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nationality on right of free movement that is granted by Article 39 (ex 48). 
This article not only secures the free movement of workers within the 
member-states but also eliminates the nationality discrimination against 
workers. Even though workers are given the right to move freely between 
member-states through Article 39 (ex 48), this right has been subjected to 
the limitations including public policy, public security or public health. It is 
under the authority of member-states to determine whether an action taken 
by a private citizen or an institution is against its public security, public 
health or public policy. In addition to this, national authorities are entitled to 
define the parameters of public policy, public security and public health.  
At first sight, the regulation of free movement of workers in Article 
39 (ex 48) seems to be conditional. However, Hartley (1998) and Weatherill 
and Beaumont (1999) state that Article 39 (ex 48), despite the limitations on 
the grounds of public policy, public security or public health, is considered 
to be directly effective. To put the argument differently, there is a strong 
discretionary element within the proposed article; therefore, one might 
easily believe that it lacks direct effect. However like the ECJ did, all three 
writers justified their arguments on the ground that the application of 
limitations is subjected to judicial control; so Article 39 (ex 48) may be 
directly invoked by individuals in order to confront the nationality 
discrimination before a national court. It is also worth noting that the free 
movement is a right provided by the Community law; therefore, generally a 
Community provision concerned with this principle is deemed to be directly 
effective.   
 
2.1.3. Not Contingent on Any Discretionary Implementing Measure 
T 
 
here are a number of Community provisions, which grant rights to 
individuals. The crucial point is that not all of those provisions are 
directly effective since they are contingent on a discretionary implementing 
measure to grant rights to individuals. In other words, their implementations 
are dependent on further action taken by either a national authority or 
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European institutions. If this is the case, one can assume that the provision 
of the Community concerned would not be directly effective unless the 
national authorities or Community institutions took a further action.  
However, it should also be noted that Community provisions have a 
time limit for their implementation. Therefore, a Community provision 
could easily be directly effective if the member-state concerned fails to 
implement it in the given time limit. 
 Once more Article 141 (ex 119) EC can be given as an example. 
According to this article, member-states are obliged to ensure an equal 
payment for men and women. In order to provide equal payment 
requirement member-states had to take all necessary measures. This had to 
be done in a time limit determined by the Community institutions. In 
Defrenne v. SABENA (Case 43/75) the ECJ held that even though Article 
141 EC required further action from the member-state’s end, it was directly 
effective since the time limit had expired.    
 Actually, this last condition is useless recently because almost each 
directive has a deadline, i.e. Community provisions need a further action 
taken by the member-states. The only effect of this time limit as Hartley 
says in his 1998 study is that “direct effect is postponed until the deadline 
has passed.” (195).  
 
2.2. Evolution of Direct Effect Doctrine:  
2.2.1. Traditional and Modern Definitions 
 
D octrine of direct effect neither has a specific meaning nor an original definition that is commonly accepted by scholars and legal 
practitioners. However, as many other legal terms, it has also developed a 
widely accepted connotation, and then gained a broader meaning through 
the various comments of the ECJ on different case law. The crucial point is 
that the debate over the clarity of the direct effect doctrine still continues; 
for example, some academics insist (Ruffert 1997; Van Gerven 2000; Craig 
& de Búrca 2003) on the groundlessness of the necessity of ‘conferral of 
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rights on individuals’ precondition. Unlike Hartley (1998), they say the 
conferral of rights on individuals is not a necessity for a directive to be 
directly effective. On the other hand, ‘conferral of rights’ clause maybe an 
expected outcome of direct effect, but it should not be evaluated as if it is a 
sine qua non.  Instead of searching for a ‘conferral of rights,’ they offer to 
look at whether the directive fulfils the following requirements: whether it is 
sufficiently precise and clear, and unconditional.     
Undoubtedly, the modern definition5 of the term direct effect is 
reborn through the Court’s judgement on Van Gend en Loos (Case 26/62). 
The Court accepts classical or modern definitions of the direct effect 
alternately in its various decisions. In Van Gend en Loos (Case 26/62), the 
Court ruled that the Article 25 (ex 12) EC should be interpreted as 
producing direct effect and creating individual rights. However, creating 
individual rights was not set as a precondition for producing direct effect.  
Modern definition of the direct effect doctrine can also be evaluated 
as the expression of the applicability of the Community law before a 
national court. This is sometimes referred to as ‘objective’ direct effect 
(Craig & de Búrca 2003: 180). According to Van Gerven’s 2000 study, “ 
‘objective’ direct effect refers to cases where a directive does not grant a 
‘subjective’ right to individuals but only imposes a specific obligation on 
member states” (506). While Van Gerven (2000), explains it as a 
confirmation of link between ‘obligations’ of member-states and an 
individual rights requirement,  others (Ruffert 1997) find that “the only test 
for direct effect is whether the provision is sufficiently precise and 
unconditional” (1056). 
It is obvious that the modern definition of the direct effect doctrine 
does not necessarily require a conferral of legal rights to an individual who 
invokes the provision of a directive before a national court of law. The 
 
5 This time I call this definition of the direct effect doctrine as ‘modern’; Van Gerven and 
many others sometimes call it objective; Craig and de Búrca on the other hand prefer to call 
it broader definition of the direct effect doctrine.  
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‘traditional’6 definition, on the other hand, requires the conferral of rights on 
individuals, which is occasionally called ‘subjective’ direct effect.      
As former advocate-general [hereinafter A.G.], Van Gerven (2000) 
indicates, “the distinction between subjective and objective direct effect 
stems from German Law” (506). In the German point of view, the provision 
of a directive produces a direct effect when it is sufficiently precise, and 
unconditional; and besides, it has to confer rights on individuals that are 
enforceable before a national court.  The ECJ, on the other hand, does not 
adopt all of the preconditions set out by the German law that requires both 
subjective and objective definitions for directive provisions to be directly 
effective. According to the ECJ, it is possible for a directive to be directly 
effective when it is just sufficiently precise and unconditional, because 
according to the Court when provisions of a directive are sufficiently precise 
and unconditional it naturally grants rights to individuals.    
 
2.2.2. ‘Subjective’ Direct Effect: Individual Rights as a Condition for 
Direct Effect (?) 
 
ndividual rights are one of the core subjects of the Community law. As 
Ruffert indicates in his 1997 study, “without exaggeration, it can be said 
that rights are a fundamental topic in the ongoing development of 
Community law” (307). Therefore, when it comes to evaluating the direct 
effect of directives, individual rights should also be touched upon. When 
Community produces a new directive, a transposition process or 
internalization of Community directive concerned takes place within the 
member-states. A member-state may transpose a Community directive to its 
domestic law either by specific legislation or through the application of a 
general legal expression, which are clear enough and unconditional for the 
individuals to comprehend. To put the matter differently, member-states 
must transpose the Community directives in such a manner that individuals 
may be fully aware of their rights and rely on those directives before their 
I 
 
6 I refer this definition of direct effect as ‘traditional’. 
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national courts when their rights are violated. The transposition or 
internalization process will be returned below.  
 As it is stated above, the distinction between subjective and objective 
direct effect stems from German law which asserts that the existence of an 
individual right is a precondition for a directive to be directly effective. On 
the other hand, according to the Court, if the provisions of directives are 
sufficiently precise and unconditional, they produce direct effect. Some 
academics, particularly the German ones, insist on the existence of conferral 
of rights test and they say direct effect is related with the individual interest 
(Ruffert 1997). This view was first developed through the refusal of the 
direct effect of environmental directives of the Community by the German 
authorities. In this regard in Becker v Finanzamt Munster-Innenstadt (Case 
8/81, [1982] ECR 53) the ECJ held that   
 
[…] wherever the provisions of a directive appear, as far as 
their subject-matter is concerned, to be unconditional and 
sufficiently precise, those provisions may, in the absence of 
implementing measures adopted within the prescribed period, be 
relied upon as against any national provision which is incompatible 
with the directive or in so far as the provisions define rights which 
individuals are able to assert against the State. 
 
After reading the above statement of the Court, one may think that direct 
effect is directly associated with the existence of individual rights. However, 
thanks to Ruffert (1997), who assesses the above statement of the Court in 
much more straightforward language than any other academic does, it is 
clear that the detection of an individual right derived from the content of a 
directive provision was at least an alternative way to establish its direct 
effect. The ECJ came to the same conclusion a number of times as follows 
in its various decisions:  
 
[…] whenever the provisions of a directive appear, so far as 
their subject-matter is concerned, to be unconditional and 
sufficiently precise, they may be relied upon before the national 
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courts by individuals against the State where the latter has failed to 
implement the directive in domestic law by the end of the period 
prescribed or where it has failed to implement the directive 
correctly7. 
 
However, the issue that will be considered here is not the exact analogy of 
the wording of that the Court used in several decisions after the Becker 
(Case 8/81) judgement. Careful readers may easily recognise the Court 
avoided using the second part of the Becker judgement in the above 
statement. Instead of asserting the existence of individual rights as a 
precondition, the ECJ prefers to examine the Community directive by just 
examining the directive’s nature whether it is sufficiently precise and 
unconditional. Like in the Becker (Case 8/81) case, in Francovich  and 
Others (Case 6/90, Case 9/90 [1991] ECR I-5357) and Marks & Spencer 
(Case 62/00 [2002] ECR I6325) decisions, the ECJ made a test that is 
defined in the first sentence of the Becker judgement.   
 The other judgement of the Court, which is worth analysing here 
since it is related with the direct effect doctrine is the Marshall v. 
Southampton and South West Hampshire Area Health Authority – Marshall 
II, (Case C-271/91 [1993] ECR 1-4367)8. In Marshall II, the ECJ did not 
quote the individual right clause, on the contrary, the Court quoted 
Francovich judgement by applying only the test of sufficient precision and 
unconditionality.  
Similarly, in Comitato di Coordinamento per la Difesa dela 
Cavaand others v Regione Lombardia and others9 (Case C-236/92 [1994] 
 
7See, inter alia, Joined Cases C6/90 and C9/90 Francovich and Others [1991] ECR I5357, 
paragraph 11, and Case C62/00 Marks & Spencer [2002] ECR I6325, paragraph 25. 
8 Case C-271/91, Marshall v. Southampton and South West Hampshire Area Health 
Authority – Marshall II, [1993] ECR 1-4367. Miss Marshall was an employee of AHA, 
who was dismissed at age 62 on the ground that she exceeds the retirement age for women. 
The retirement age for women was set 60 and 65 for men. Miss Marshall wished to remain 
in her duty and argued that the act is against the Council Directive 76/207 on Equal 
Treatment. The national court asked two questions to the ECJ: whether the dismissal of 
Miss Marshall was unlawful and whether she could rely uon the Community Directive 
76/207 against another private party.  
9 Comitato, which was an environmental interest group, brought an action against the 
establishment of a tip for waste on the grounds that Article 4 of the Waste Framework 
Directive grants individuals rights which must be protected. I will return to this case-law of 
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ECR 1-483) the ECJ held that the Article 4 of the Waste Framework 
Directive10 was not sufficiently precise and unconditional therefore it was 
not directly effective. Besides, it did not create rights for individuals 
because the wording of Article 4 was not sufficiently precise and 
unconditional. As Ruffert (1997) indicates, “the Court does not consider 
individual rights as a condition of direct effect, but as its consequence” 
(315). It is obvious from the decision taken by the ECJ that the existence of 
direct effect doctrine depends on the precise and unconditional wording of 
the related provision; but not the existence of individual rights. To conclude 
it can be asserted that, neither case implies a change in the test for direct 
effect in the sense that protected interests were introduced as a condition. 
 
2.2.2.1. The Doctrinal Function of Direct Effect 
 
he purpose of the ECJ is not only evaluated by analysing the decisions 
taken during the case law. The doctrinal aim of the ECJ is providing 
member-states’ compliance to the Community law through the correct 
implementation of the directives at state-level. As Ruffert (1997) indicates, 
by granting the control power to implement the Community law before the 
national courts, the ECJ provides the decentralization of the control 
mechanism, which is normally a duty to be implemented by the 
Commission. As a result, the Commission is relieved from its watchdog 
role. In German law, for example, there is a difference between the 
protection of individual rights and protection of the common interest. The 
Court, by giving direct effect to the directives provides a system that leads 
to the protection of the common interest of the European citizens. The Court 
probably believes that the effective implementation of the directives will 
T 
 
the Court in the following chapter that examines the meaning of “suffciently precise” 
condition.   
10 Article 4 of the Waste Framework Directive reads as follows: Member-states shall take 
the necessary measures to ensure that waste is recovered or disposed of without 
endangering human health and without harming the environment, an in particular:  a) 
without risk to water, air, soil and plants and animals, b) without causing a nuisance 
through noise or odour, c) without adversely affecting the countryside or places of special 
interest.   
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result in the inclusion of the European citizens in the implementation 
process and this process eventually leads to the protection of the common 
interest.  
 
2.2.2.2 Transposition and Implementation of Community Directives 
 
he internalization process may frequently become the subject of an 
appeal before the ECJ and national courts. This is the result of 
incorrect transposition of the directives to the domestic law. The ECJ held 
that such cases would have been avoided if the member-state concerned had 
correctly implemented the related directive into the national law11. It may be 
necessary to analyse the constitution of a Community directive in the light 
of its prospect to produce a direct effect. The objective of some directives 
might solely be ‘the creation of individual rights’; others may not intend to 
produce individual rights.  
T 
A Community directive is formulated within the Community level 
(first step) and then it is transposed into the national law (second step) in the 
framework of national laws of the transposition. The ECJ held that the 
national rules of transposition have to be so clear and unconditional that a 
private party, where appropriate, may rely on them before a national court. 
The creation of individual rights may occur at domestic-level, but not during 
the formulation of the directive in the Community-level. In conclusion, two 
different types of individual rights may come into existence. First, 
individual rights that occur in the Community level during the composition 
of a directive. Second, individual rights that may stem from the 
transposition process in domestic level. The first one is dependent on the 
precision and unconditionality test. For the second one there is a need to 
create individual rights at the state-level.  
 The problematic issue here is that the Court does not determine 
which directives were meant to produce individual rights. Only some 
 
11 Such a constraint is made in Marshall case (Marshall v Southampton and South West 
Hampshire Area Health Authority Case 152/84 [1986], ECR 723, Commision v Germany 
1991] ECR I-825, Commision v Germany C-298/95 [1996] etc.     
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directives are meant to create individual rights including the ones on the 
environment and the ones that are related to public procurements. Which 
directives provide individual rights and when? Ruffert (1997) responds that 
the answer to those questions must be given at Community law level. 
However, it is also necessary to take member-states’ domestic laws into 
consideration in order to prevent any failure during the transposition 
process. EC is composed of a number of countries whose constitutional laws 
are different from each other. In order to provide effective transposition and 
implementation it is necessary to consider those differences and provide a 
solution that complies all the member-states’ domestic laws.  
When the focal point of a directive is the individual, it may be 
necessary to produce individual rights. In other words, the creation of 
individual rights would be the outcome of the concerned directive. 
Community law has a protective character concerning the individuals. 
Therefore, transposition process of a directive must also consider the 
protection of individual interests in order to comply with the spirit of the 
Treaty. Secondly, the implementation of a directive may affect individuals 
(in other words, an applicant may be factually affected by any 
administrative decision); when this is the case; the directive concerned must 
also include individual rights at the domestic-level.  In short, Community 
law mostly confers individual rights in order to enhance Community 
directive’s effective implementation. .  
Individual rights may occur because of direct effect and they may be 
created as a consequence of transposition process. If the aim of a 
Community directive is solely the protection of individual rights and if such 
interests are factually concerned it can shortly be asserted that concerned 
directive must create individual rights. Creation of individual rights during 
the transposition process has to be considered separately. To conclude, it 
could be said that the concepts that are produced by the Community would 
be more effective if they, theoretically, fit in the legal systems of the 
member-states because the better these concepts fit the better they will be 
implemented in practice. 
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3. The Direct Effect of Community Law: Sword or Shield? 
 
3.1. Introduction: Position of Direct Effect in the Community 
 
he doctrine of direct effect has always been the central point of 
discussions between the Community legal order and the national law 
of the member-states. Direct effect doctrine not only results in scores of 
discussions among national courts and the ECJ but it influences the 
development of the constitutional laws of the member-states. Direct effect 
doctrine makes the Community law distinctive from other international 
organisations; it “makes the Community legal order unique” (Prechal 2000: 
1047). As some academics say “by placing Community law directly before 
the national courts, it has de facto and has decisively contributed to the 
acceptance of Community law as law which must be applied by national 
courts” (Prechal 2000: 1047). To put the matter differently, individuals may 
invoke or rely on Community provisions before national courts, at least in 
theory. This is the outcome of the direct effect mechanism. If a directive is 
directly effective, national courts have to treat it, as the law of the land, i.e. a 
provision made by an outsider will be treated as a law promulgated in the 
land of origin.  
T 
 Direct effect doctrine has functioned as a “sword” (Prechal 2000) in 
the Community legal system because through it, national courts have to 
apply the Community law to the cases brought before them. Provisions of a 
Community directive would be equated with the national ones. To put it 
another way, national judges are obliged to treat the Community provisions 
as if they are the part of national laws. It is with this perspective that the 
constitutional background of direct effect doctrine should be examined. 
“The constitutional background of direct effect is formed by Articles 65 and 
66 of the Dutch Constitution” (de Witte 1999: 180). Article 65 of the Dutch 
Constitution held that  [p]rovisions of agreements which, according to their 
terms, can be binding on anyone shall have such binding force after having 
been published” and Article 66 added: “[L]egislation in force within the 
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Kingdom shall not apply if this application would be incompatible with 
provisions of agreements which are binding upon anyone and which have 
been entered into either before or after the enactment of such legislation.”     
On the other hand, some academics (Prechal 2000) claim that by 
limiting the powers of national judges to review national law in the light of 
international law provisions, the direct effect doctrine has functioned as a 
‘shield’ (p.1047). In this regard, the Dutch authorities’ constitutional 
amendment above limits the application of international agreements by the 
national judges. Through this constitutional amendment, national judges 
could not apply any international agreement that is not directly effective—
or, as de Witte puts it in his 1999 study of a ‘self executing character’, as 
traditionally expressed in international law(179). Instead of testing the 
compatibility of all national law to the international agreements, judges are 
encouraged to make a self-execution test. Indeed, under Dutch 
Constitutional law, as mentioned above, self-executing or directly effective 
provisions of any international treaty will prevail over conflicting national 
law.    
To put the matter differently, state authorities may be able to turn the 
sword into a shield. The issue to be considered in the following section is 
whether decision-makers in several member-states are able to turn the 
doctrine of direct effect—which has made the Community legal order 
unique since the founding years—into a concept functioning as a shield by 
limiting the powers of national judges to review national law in the light of 
international law provisions.  
 
3.2. The Jurisprudential Nature of Direct Effect Doctrine  
3.2.1. Administrative Direct Effect 
E 
 
CJ aimed to control judicial behaviours of the member-states by 
developing the direct effect doctrine four decades ago. One must 
understand that direct effect doctrine relates to the ‘activities’ of national 
courts of the member-states. In other words, national courts of the member-
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states are the addressees of the direct effect doctrine. As de Witte (1999) 
clearly defines “direct effect can be provisionally defined as the capacity of 
a norm of Community law to be applied in domestic court proceedings” 
(179). Prechal’s 1996 study on direct effect arrives with a similar definition. 
She defines direct effect as follows: “direct effect is the obligation of a court 
or another authority to apply the relevant provisions of Community law, 
either as a norm which governs the case or as a standard for legal review” 
(qtd. in Prechal 2000: 1048). According to de Witte (1999) those kind of 
traditional definitions say nothing specific either on Community law or on 
the norms of national laws of the member-states. Therefore, as Prechal 
(2000) says the concept of direct effect should be reconsidered.         
The ECJ provides a mechanism that controls the compliance of 
member-states with the Community law through the mediation of national 
courts. In other words, as Ruffert (1997) puts it, the system of checks and 
balances is decentralised with this effort and besides, effective participation 
of national courts is reinforced. National courts are obliged to apply the 
directly effective Community provisions, i.e. an obligation is entrusted to 
the member-states by the ECJ. The issue to be discussed briefly herein is 
whether this obligation was a result of a ‘dialogue’ between the ECJ and the 
national courts.  
Actually, this duty to apply is not a result of dialogue between 
parties concerned. Even though creation of rights is not set as a condition 
during the Van Gend en Loos case, the concept of direct effect is often 
equated with the creation of rights for individuals that national courts must 
protect. This issue has already been introduced in the above through 
analysis of German national law. Therefore, it will not be handled here in 
detail. However, it should be noted that the provisions of Community 
directives generally grant individuals a privilege to interrogate the actions of 
member-states when they get suspicious of a legality of a member-state 
action. To put the matter differently, individuals may rely on the provisions 
of a Community directive against a member-state before a national court 
because directives set out procedural obligations for the member-states.  
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In this regard, it would be appropriate to examine the case law of the 
ECJ. In CIA Security International v. Signalson SA and Securitel SPRL 
(Case C-194/94, [1996] ECR I-2201), which is a case law related with the 
prior notification of technical standards to the Commission, the Court has 
taken this kind of decision. The issue to be considered herein is not the 
details of case law itself, but to determine whether the notification 
provisions of Directive 83/189 are directly effective and whether breach of 
the obligation to notify the Commission constitutes legal consequences for 
the member-states. The Court, prior to its judgement, referred to its settled 
case law on direct effect citing Becker and Franchovich. In other words, the 
Court made its famous test of sufficient precision and unconditionality. The 
ECJ held that the concerned provisions of Directive 83/189 are sufficiently 
precise and unconditional and besides set out procedural obligations for 
member-states that must be complied with. In the light of these grounds 
above, the Court decided that the concerned provisions of Directive 83/189 
are directly effective. The German, Dutch and UK governments claimed 
that the Directive 83/189 was solely concerned with relations between the 
member-states and the Commission, and added that so-called directive 
creates obligations for the former without affecting their power to adopt 
technical regulations. According to the Court, this could not be a reason for 
non-compliance with the directive. To put the matter differently, even 
though technical regulations are inapplicable to individuals, Directive 
83/189 provides an obligation to the member-states to notify. Therefore, the 
non-existence of individual rights cannot be a reason of failure to comply 
the notification obligation.  
There is another characteristic of direct effect that is not discussed 
above i.e. it is an obligation for a court or any other administrative authority. 
In order to show the scope of this form of direct effect, de Witte (1999) 
looks at the judgement of the Court in Costanzo (Case 103/88 [1989] ECR 
1839) where the ECJ held that:  
 
When the conditions under which the Court has held that 
individuals may rely on the provisions of a directive before the 
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national courts are met, all organs of the administration, including 
decentralised authorities such as municipalities, are obliged to apply 
those provisions (188).  
 
This form of direct effect is called ‘administrative direct effect’ and as 
Prechal (2000) says, since there is no other more recent case law on this 
issue which addresses these implications, we have to take this form of direct 
effect seriously (1049).  
 
3.2.2. Invocation of Community Directives by National Courts 
 
A s mentioned previously the legal position of individuals within the directly effective Community directives is an evergreen issue to be 
discussed. However, the other crucial point that deserves attention is 
whether directly effective provisions of Community law come into existence 
just when individuals rely on them. Actually, the idea that directly effective 
provisions of a directive are operational when individuals invoke them is not 
held by the ECJ. In Van Schijndel v. Stichting Pensioenfonds voor 
Fysiootherapeuten (C-430/93 [1995] ECR I-4705) and Peterbroeck v. 
Belgian State (C-312/93 [1995] ECR I-4599) the Court made clear that even 
courts and national administrations are obliged to apply directly effective 
Community provisions. To put the matter differently, national courts have to 
apply Community law even though none of the parties rely on it. According 
to the ECJ, applying the directly effective provisions is the duty of national 
courts, i.e. “it implies a duty for the courts to give full effect to the 
provisions at issue” (Prechal 1998: 684). Direct effect is not an issue that is 
invoked by individuals; rather it is an issue that involves the invocation of it 
by the national courts. As a result, it is clear from the relatively new case 
law of the ECJ that the application of directly effective Community 
provisions by national courts of their own motion is an obligation and a duty 
for the national courts even if the parties concerned do not rely upon it. 
These statements were first reinforced in the seventies by the Court through  
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Simenthal SpA v. Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato (Case 106/77 
[1977] ECR 629). In Simenthal ECJ held that:  
 
National courts should not request or await the prior setting 
aside of an incompatible national provision by legislation or other 
constitutional means but of its own motion, if necessary, refuse the 
application of conflicting national law and instead apply Community 
law (Templeman & Kaczorowska 2000: 126).  
 
It is clear from the wording of the ECJ that it is the obligation of courts to 
apply the directly effective provisions of the Community of its own motion. 
As a result, the direct effect doctrine is not an issue regarding the 
individuals but it is an issue that involves the national court’s application to 
it. 
 
3.2.3. Directly Effective Provisions of Community Law 
 
criticism, which has often been raised, is how the national courts of 
member-states would expound the direct effect and which kind of 
provisions can be considered as directly effective. Another concept, as one 
scholar (Prechal 2000) calls it “the broader concept of invocability,” is  
important. According to Prechal this concept is broader because  
A 
 
[…] it also allows those provisions to be successfully relied 
upon, which do not as such create rights or do not have the objective 
to do so, but may in a proceedings be invoked for other purposes, for 
example as a defence in criminal proceedings or as a standard for 
review of the legality of member-state’s action in administrative 
proceedings (1050).    
 
In fact it is the structure and the nature of the proceedings pleaded before 
the national courts, which determine the structure of a Community provision 
and whether it is directly effective or not. One must also bear in mind that 
the existence of individual rights is not out of scope of the Court. The ECJ 
still uses the individual rights as a concept to explain the direct effect 
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doctrine. In the Queen v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food ex 
parte: Hedley Lomas (Ireland) Ltd. (Case C-5/94 [1996] ECR I-2553) the 
ECJ coincided the direct effect doctrine with the existence of creation of 
rights. Therefore, the existence of creation of rights is still on the European 
scene to be discussed.   
 
3.3. Renewed Discussions on Direct Effect Doctrine 
F 
 
rom the very beginning of the discussions on direct effect doctrine, 
legality review has been one of the evergreen issues which has been 
the subject of debate and controversy between the member-states and the 
ECJ. The ECJ decides whether Community law provisions are directly 
effective. The new discussions on the legality review took place in a decade 
old decision of the Court. In Aaannemersbedrijf P. K. Kraaijeveld B.V. and 
Others v. Gedeputeerde Staten van Zuid-Holland (C-7295 [1996] ECR I-
5403), the Court held that member-states failure to comply with the 
environmental directive within a given time limit would not exclude the 
individuals to sue the state, for not realizing its obligation resulting from the 
concerned directive, before national courts. As is well known, the old debate 
on the creation of rights as a condition for direct effect is still on the agenda 
of the member-states. Jan Winter’s 1972 study made “a famous distinction 
between direct applicability and direct effect” (qtd. in Prechal 2000: 1052). 
According to this distinction, separation of the existence of individual rights 
from the direct effect results in severe confusion in the definition of direct 
effect doctrine because individual rights have always been related with the 
direct effect doctrine in most of the case law, and the set of minds of the 
scholars. Actually, many old-school scholars who analyse the directives 
capable of direct effect had come to the same conclusion. For almost all 
scholars, who wrote in the first decade of the concept, direct effect cannot 
be defined separately from the existence of individual rights. What was 
more striking for them was the division between direct applicability and 
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direct effect. Easson in his 1979 study equates the direct applicability with 
Community regulations. He explains it as follows: 
   
It is binding in its entirety, not merely as to the result as to be 
achieved, and it is directly applicable within the legal systems of all 
member-states without the necessity of being implemented or 
incorporated into national legal systems by any national measure 
(320). 
 
According to Winter (1972), Easson (1979) and Pescatore (1982) directives, 
which are binding only upon certain member-states or individuals, are said 
to be directly effective if they confer rights on individuals. However, 
according to Winter (1972) and Pescatore (1982) directives that are not 
capable of direct effect as they are not conferring rights on individuals may 
still have certain limited effects. Pescatore (1982) calls these directives as 
“less perfect provisions” (155) of Community. In order to produce direct 
effect it is necessary to test these Community provisions on the grounds of 
legality of actions taken by member-states.  It is clear from the explanations 
above; there is a difference between direct effect with the existence of 
individual rights and moderate form of direct effect, which is related to the 
review of the legality of Community acts. 
 In most common law countries, such as the United Kingdom, the 
focus of attention is remedies instead of rights that are enforceable before 
the national courts. Remedy does not result from rights but it is evaluated as 
a “cause of an action” (Prechal 2000: 1053-1054). From this point of view, 
diverging rights from remedies is impossible. The breach of a Community 
law is a result of causes of action that will bring a remedy to the applicant. 
In continental law countries, on the other hand, such as France and Belgium, 
the attention is on the administrative actions that are incompatible with the 
Community law. In other words, the creation of individual rights is not 
considered as a condition for direct effect.  In France and Belgium the only 
important test is the legality of the legislative acts; i.e. the compatibility of 
the legislative acts with the concerned Community directive. An individual 
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may even rely on a directive to review the legality of the national measures. 
In addition to those countries, in the Netherlands, the perception of direct 
effect is free from the existence of individual rights. Like France and 
Belgium, in the Netherlands the legality review is allowed, i.e. individuals 
may invoke a Community directive before a national court to review its 
legality based on Community law.  
 In the CIA Security (Case C-194/94), the ECJ ruled that “where a 
member-state neglects to notify draft national technical regulations to the 
Commission in breach of the obligations set out in Directive 87/189, it may 
not rely on those regulations in subsequent proceedings before national 
courts” (Weatherill & Newman 1999: 217). To put it another way, national 
measures on technical standards without notifying the Commission were 
inapplicable. Beyond this inapplicability a relatively recent attempt has been 
initiated to utilize the Court’s judgement on CIA Security. In Criminal 
Proceedings against Johannes Martinus Lemmens (C-227/97 [1998] ECR I-
3711), Mr Lemmens was charged with driving his vehicle while he was 
under the influence of alcohol, which was proved through the use of a 
breathalyser, a technical machine used to measure the alcohol in the blood. 
The use of breathalyser was put into effect by a ministerial regulation. 
Unfortunately, as in the CIA Security case, the administrative authority 
failed to notify the Commission as was required by the same directive, 
namely, Directive 83/189. As a result, Lemmens relied on that directive 
before the Dutch national court and claimed that the use of a breathalyser 
was against the Community directive. Unlike the CIA Security judgement, 
in Lemmens the Court held that the field of criminal law was not under the 
scope of the application of Community law12. However, a new question has 
 
12 Actually, the purpose of the Directive 83/189 is to protect the freedom of movement of 
goods. The Community itself has no explicit competence to adopt legislation which 
imposes criminal penalties. However, one must bear in mind that the Community law may 
affect the exercise of national competence in the field of criminal justice. The Court did not 
notify the Commission on the breathalyser. But in the Lemmens case, the consequences 
were different. It involves the use of a breathalyser but neither the import of the 
breathalyser nor trade of it; therefore, the use of brerathalyser by Dutch authorities did not 
create any obstacle to trade and did not produce direct effect that was enforceable before 
the national courts.  For more details on this issue see “Weatherill, S. & Newman K. 1999, 
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arisen from the Lemmens case: “Who is allowed to rely on this 
inapplicability?” (Prechal 2000). According to A.G. Fennelly (qtd. in 
Prechal 2000), “Only those persons whose interests are intended to be 
protected by the directive provisions may invoke the directive before the 
courts” (1056). According to the Court, the purpose of Directive 83/189 is 
to protect the freedom of movement for goods by means of preventive 
control. The use of breathalyser by the local authorities in the Lemmens case 
was not considered as an obstacle to the trade. Therefore, an individual 
could not rely upon notification requirement under concerned directive 
before a national court. Nevertheless, the Court did not make clear who is 
allowed to rely on this inapplicability. Prechal (2000) says that by avoiding 
this issue the Court is paving the way for different interpretations. In this 
regard, Van Gerven in his 2000 study highlights the link between the 
claimants’ invocation of Community law and the issue of individual’s right 
(501-508). In his study Van Gerven makes a link between the effective 
judicial protection of Community rights and uniform application of 
Community law in all member-states.  
 Prechal’s 2000 study, on the other hand, even though not denying the 
role of the matter of interest in the direct effect doctrine, asserts that 
“introducing an interest requirement of this type for the “invocability” of 
Community law provisions would amount to an unnecessary and 
incomprehensible restriction, adding in fact a new condition for direct 
effect” (1056). Indeed, claiming an interest requirement means nothing but a 
subsequent limitation to the direct effect doctrine to be applied. According 
to Prechal (2000) the issue of protection of individual interest plays a 
pivotal role at national procedural level. The protection of individual interest 
may not be considered an issue of direct effect. Therefore, in order not to 
retreat from the scope of direct effect doctrine it is sufficient to indicate that 
the interest requirement is a matter of different parts of the Community law, 
e.g. a condition in actions for damages.  
 
 
‘Free Movement of Goods’, The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 48, 
no. 1, pp. 217-219.”   
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3.3.1. Individual Rights v. Legal Review: In Search of Direct Effect 
 
ven though “the intention to grant rights is not a condition of direct 
effect, but a consequence” (Ruffert 1997: 315) Van Gerven’s 2000 
study made clear that “granting rights is a condition for state liability to 
arise” (507). Rights v. legal review in search of direct effect will be 
considered briefly in three different articles in this paper: One by Van 
Gerven (2000), who indicates the ambiguity of the concept of ‘right’; one by 
Coppel (1994), who investigates the concept of ‘right’ by using the 
analytical legal philosophy; and one by Prechal (2000), who based her 
argument of ‘rights’ on the ‘legality review’.  
E 
 The notion of ‘right’, as the direct effect doctrine, has always been 
the subject of controversy and debate within the Community. It is an 
evergreen issue, which has resulted in broader discussions in the different 
school of thoughts. Some scholars seek to explain the notion of right by 
Hohfeldian13 terms and other scholars have severely condemned the Court’s 
attitude towards it to make their own definition of right.  There are also 
divergences in the depiction of the features of the rights among the member-
states that makes the issue more complex.      
     Van Gerven, who criticizes the Court’s attitude in his 2000 study, 
indicates that the use of rights language of the Court adds nothing but 
confusion to the matter. As Prechal (2006) says, “[…] the ECJ has not really 
indicated what it means […] by the term ‘right’.” In the Becker judgement, as 
mentioned under the title of “‘Subjective’ direct effect”, the Court held that 
direct effect might occur if the provisions are sufficiently precise and 
unconditional, i.e. if national measures are incompatible with the 
Community law, former should be replaced by the latter. Nevertheless, the 
Court in its judgement did not consider any “specific right” (Van Gerven 
 
13 Hohfeld analysis is based on the distinction between the notion of ‘right’ and the notion 
of ‘liberty’. Hohfeld argued that the right and duty were corelative concepts. One must 
always be matched with the other. Each individual has a relationship with the other. Each 
individual had rights and duties. The relationship between rights and duties determine the 
degree of liberty. The corelative between right and duty describes the way in which two 
individuals are limited in their choices to act.     
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2000) or “procedural right” (Prechal 2000) given to the private party. 
According to Van Gerven (2000) by not determining the specific ‘rights’ in 
the Becker case the Court “demonstrates how ambiguous the concept of a 
‘right’ is” (507). Van Gerven’s 2000 study states the following: 
 
It refers to the general right, and accompanying remedy, to 
have a court set aside national measures which conflict with the 
requirements of a directive, but may also refer to a specific right 
which a directive grants to private parties, and which, together with 
other conditions, gives rise […] to a right and an accompanying 
remedy for compensation in respect of harm sustained (507).  
  
As is clear from the case law above, like direct effect, the notion of right 
turned out to be an ambiguous concept. The notion of ‘right’ defined by Van 
Gerven (2000) is not important to demonstrate the existence of direct effect; 
however, it is vital to determine the remedy. In the same respect, Prechal 
(2000) indicates that  “[…] direct effect has been labelled, not least by the 
Court itself, as the right to rely on Community law provisions” (1057).  
 Coppel (1994) by using the Hohfeldian school of thought puts 
emphasis on the three identical and interrelated definitions of ‘right’. ‘Right’ 
that is correlated with the existence of ‘duties’; ‘right’ prior to ‘duties’ and 
finally, ‘right’ that is “prior to duties and necessitate the establishment of a 
list of duties which is open-ended, which may be added to (or reduced) as 
circumstances change, and according to what is necessary to secure the 
protection of the right in question” (866). In Marshall the Court refused to 
give horizontal direct effect to the Community directives, but stated that the 
AHA14 was an emanation of an administrative authority, i.e. public body. 
The foundation of this judgement may be evaluated in the Hohfeldian 
school of thought. Individuals cannot have rights under directives against 
other individuals because the latter have no duties under directives (Coppel 
1994: 867). In the Community part of the spectrum, it can be asserted that 
 
14 The facts of the Marshall case was given on the footnote 6, in Chapter 2 under the title of 
‘Subjective’ direct effect.   
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only member-states have duties or obligations under directives, therefore, 
the only right that could be claimed is one that is against the state.      
Prechal’s 2000 study, on the other hand, focuses on the review of 
legality and immunity borrowed from the Hohfeld’s analytical approach, 
and states that: 
 
[…] a case in which an individual relies on Community law 
provisions for the purposes of legality review, whether in a 
proceeding against another individual or against the state, a 
successful case will result in an immunity: neither the private 
defendant nor the State could in turn rely on the national rules for 
their purposes (1058).      
 
From the statements above, it is obvious that neither the rights issue nor the 
legality view itself are divorced from each other. Although legality review 
may not be considered as an alternative way to define the invocability of the 
Community law, it is still related with the specific conditions of the direct 
effect namely, sufficient precision and unconditionality.    
 
3.3.2. Combining the Notion of Rights with Direct Effect  
 
Like the notion of right, direct effect seems to have been diluted by the 
member-states. As is well known, German perceptions result in the 
development of two different notions of direct effect: Direct effect in a 
narrow sense, according to which direct effect relates to the notion of 
individual rights, and objective direct effect that depends on the precision 
and unconditionality test rather than putting individual rights as a 
precondition. When the broader definition is adopted, it involves the 
application of Community law before a national court of law by any private 
party or an administrative authority that may rely on Community provisions 
to review legality of member-state action, to control the use of discretion by 
member-states and as a defence in criminal proceedings.  
                                                                            
                                                                                           37
 
 
The traditional usage of direct effect doctrine is that of the 
replacement of national laws that are against the Community law with the 
ones provided by the Community, i.e. the usage of Community directives 
instead of national measures that are incompatible with the former “[…] by 
way of substitution.” (Prechal 2006: 304). This is a “positive claim” 
(Prechal 2000: 1059) and seems to be a positive application of a Community 
directive’s related provisions to the national law. Secondly, by not applying 
the national laws that are against the Community law local judges may 
escape the application of Community law provisions. In this regard, after 
making a prior evaluation of concerned national law Dutch judges prefer not 
to use the national laws that are against the Community law. This is called 
disapplication of national laws that are incompatible with the Community 
law as a “negative sanction” (Prechal 2000:1060), “[…] thus by way of 
exclusion, it may suffice to resolve the Community law point.” (Prechal 
2006: 304). In other words, a process that reviews the national measures to 
see whether they are legal in the framework of Community law. Thirdly, an 
applicant, regardless of whether it is a private party or an administrative 
authority, may claim the questioning of a national law as to whether it is 
compatible with the Community law or not. This is called the legality 
review as mentioned above. In order to clarify the legality review, an 
applicant may ask, “Does a national measure on equal rights for women and 
men and the discrimination against women in the public administration go 
against the provisions of the Community directive concerned”? 
Nevertheless, in some cases it should be the national court, which legally 
examines the compatibility of a national law with the Community law. This 
is the case where a criminal proceeding is at hand. At the end of the day, 
what happens after the legality review is a declaration of legality that 
demonstrates whether the national measure questioned is compatible or 
whether it is incompatible with the Community provisions. To put the 
matter differently, like the exclusion method, review of legality or 
declaration is a negative sanction. According to some scholars, (Prechal 
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2000) the disapplication method is sufficient to achieve the results clarified 
by the Community.     
Disapplication of national laws by exclusion instead of applying the 
Community law by substitution sometimes results in a lacuna—according to 
Prechal (2000) in order to fill this gap “it may be necessary for the domestic 
court to be able to apply a Community law provision instead in order to 
resolve the case before it.” (1060). Application or substitution of 
Community law instead of national measures may produce individual rights. 
The Court’s judgement in the Becker case is based on objective direct 
effect; to put the matter differently, since the provisions of the concerned 
directive are sufficiently precise and unconditional they are relied upon 
against any national measure that is incompatible with the directive by 
individuals. In addition to this, individuals may rely on the provisions of the 
directive concerned if provisions involve rights for the benefit of individuals 
‘against the state’. 
In this perspective, it would be appropriate to examine the notion of 
rights and direct effect regarding the existence of individual rights against 
another individual—non-existence of individual rights against the state or 
the public authorities unlike the Marshall case. Although individual rights 
do exist against another individual, since horizontal direct effect has already 
been denied by the Court, an individual whose rights are violated may not 
rely on provisions of a Community directive against another individual. To 
put the matter differently, rights have been created but the mere existence of 
individual rights is not sufficient for a directive to produce direct effect. On 
the other hand, in order to create individual rights there is no need for direct 
effect. It is obvious from the above definition that the creation of rights does 
not equal to the production of direct effect, i.e. in some cases a Community 
provision may be directly effective without conferring rights to individuals 
or in some other cases a Community provision at hand, which is not directly 
effective, may confer rights to individuals. However, in some other cases, a 
Community provision, which is directly effective, may confer rights on 
individuals at the same time.                        
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However, exclusion is not falling into the line of Community point 
of view because the national measure that is against Community provisions, 
although disapplied, stays wherever it is without the positive application—
or substitution as Prechal (2006) calls it—of Community law. Therefore, it 
is necessary to enable the application of Community law at least by 
substitution instead of exclusion, which is a way of escaping the application 
of Community law before the national courts.   
 
3.3.3. The Discretion Issue: In Search of Direct Effect 
A 
 
s is very well known, although directly effective Community 
provision often result in the creation of rights, individual rights 
should not be considered as a natural outcome of direct effect. An individual 
may invoke Community provisions before a national court either for a 
legality review or for claiming rights. The importance and the fulfilment of 
the well-known conditions of the objective direct effect may vary depending 
on the situation. Regarding the legality review, a national court may ask the 
ECJ whether a Community provision at hand satisfies the conditions for 
direct effect or not. Actually, when the issue relates to the review of legality, 
as A.G. Léger (2000) indicates, “[…] the need to ensure that the directive is 
precise is less important…” (qtd. in Prechal 2006: 306). When the result is 
against the national measure, i.e. national law is incompatible with the 
Community law; the Community provision will replace the national one by 
way of substitution. On the other hand, when the issue is concerned the 
claiming of right, Community provision ‘should’ be sufficiently precise and 
unconditional. In addition to the precision and unconditionality, right should 
be claimed against a state or an emanation of state, i.e. public authority. It is 
clear from those applications that direct effect necessitates a number of 
conditions which must be satisfied when the case relates to the claiming of 
rights. One other specific point, which is necessary to state here, is that the 
traditional use of direct effect may be excluded by the existence of member-
states’ discretion.  
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 Accordingly, regarding the creation of individual rights, national 
courts cannot decide whether it is necessary to replace the national 
measure—by way of substitution—, which is incompatible with the 
Community provision, if the issue at hand falls under the discretion of 
executive or legislative. If this is the case— if, there is an existence of 
member-states discretion—the role of the national courts is very limited. 
The courts’ and the ECJ’s role is arguably limited with the judicial control 
of the executive and the legislative whether their actions are incompatible 
with the Community law. In other words, a Community provision that falls 
under the member-state’s discretion is conditional, therefore inapplicable 
and seems to be not directly effective. The notion of discretion involves a 
choice, which is held by the legislator or by the executive. As a result, as 
one scholar puts it, “the mere existence of discretion was generally 
considered to be an obstacle to direct effect.” (Prechal 2006: 307). Although 
the courts have a limited role in such a division; it is the national courts’ and 
the ECJ’s duty just to review the legality of the discretion. On the other 
hand, the courts’ role is clearer when the case involves the review of 
legality, i.e. whether the national laws or measures issued by the legislative 
or by the executive are applicable with the objectives set out by the 
Community provision. Discretion, in legality review, will not be an 
obstacle. The member-states may be free to choose the methods to achieve 
the objectives of a Community provision, but when it comes to the results, 
the provisions are binding as to the objective achieved by the member-state 
that enjoys the high degree of discretion given to it. A Community 
provision, which entrusts discretion to the member-states—one relates with 
the public policy for example—is still subjected to the judicial control of the 
courts that checks whether the public authorities remain within the 
boundaries drawn by the Community provision. Not only the actions by 
executive or by the legislative are under the control of the courts but also 
national measures can be subjected to the judicial control of the courts to 
ensure they remain within the limits set out by the concerned Community 
provision.  
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 The crucial point here is that the test for the well-known conditions 
of direct effect itself is not very important. As Prechal’s 2000 study states, 
“[…] testing the conditions is obsolete.” (1064). Member-states are obliged 
to satisfy the objectives of the rules that are ascertained them. At domestic 
level, public authorities enjoy a high degree of discretion to achieve the 
objectives of concerned obligations. Though since the national courts, in 
cooperation with the ECJ, have a right to control whether the public 
authority concerned or state as a whole, fulfil the conditions of concerned 
provision in conformity with the Community law. For example, a public 
authority may have a certain degree of discretion, but the Court may still 
assert that the directive is directly effective. Even if the Court’s discretion is 
limited, it may still decide that there is a possibility of state liability.  
Unfortunately, as Prechal (2000) states the existence of a need for 
the satisfaction of conditions, i.e. the Community provision concerned 
should be sufficiently precise and unconditional is useless. If the conditions 
are not satisfied, an individual may not invoke the provisions before the 
courts. Actually, the invocability of the provision at hand depends on the 
question asked to the Court. As mentioned above, if it is for the legality 
review, the existence of well-known conditions are less important; on the 
contrary, if it is for claiming rights, the conditions must be satisfied. An 
individual may either ask for the annulment of a decision or to use the 
Community provision for a defence in a criminal proceeding. For 
substitution to take place for an individual to claim a right—this was already 
named as a positive claim—conditions must be ensured; for the second 
one—review of legality—conditions are less important. In the first case, the 
existence of member-states’ discretion is an obstacle; for the second one, on 
the other hand, the discretion cannot be considered as an obstacle. The court 
of law may hold that the national measure should be annulled; but it is up to 
the legislative or executive to replace it, which should take into 
consideration that its decisions are subjected to judicial control of the courts.         
 Prechal’s 2000 study, by making an analogy between the state of 
courts in national law and the situation of them within the community law, 
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gives a clue as to why the conditions of direct effect are obsolete in 
particular and why the direct effect doctrine is an obstacle for the 
development of Community law in general. In this regard, it is necessary to 
briefly explore the situation of a national measure in the domestic level. In 
national law, some legal norms cannot be evaluated by the courts since they 
are subject to further elaboration by the legislature. At the end of the day, 
courts could have a very limited role in the application of concerned legal 
norms because administrative authorities may have a very high degree of 
discretionary powers on a legal norm. When this is the case, the role of the 
courts may just be to review the assessments of the national authorities. This 
review may even declare that the interpretation made by the governmental 
authorities on the national measure is against the constitution, i.e. there are 
errors in the assessment of the legal norm. Similarly, the governmental 
bodies claim that they are taking measures in conformity with the 
instructions given to them. In this case, national courts enjoy the rights 
given to them, by reviewing the legality of the measures taken by the 
executive or the legislative. To put the matter differently, the courts control 
whether the measures taken by the governmental bodies are applicable and 
remain within the limits determined by the instructions. In none of these 
cases are national courts limited by the conditions, namely whether the legal 
norms at hand are unconditional or sufficiently precise.  
Prechal (2000) by insisting on this analogy, claims that at 
Community level, the test for conditions of direct effect is meaningless and 
unnecessary in deciding whether a directive in particular or any Community 
provision in general relied upon by an individual against a state authority or 
whether the national measures concerned, is in conformity with the 
Community law. To conclude the discussion on discretion it is sufficient to 
say that although the legislative or executive decisions are subject to judicial 
control, the Court’s role is still very limited. However, it is also obvious that 
the Courts’ role is gaining more importance in the last decades. National 
courts, in cooperation with the ECJ, are gaining strength against the state 
authorities. At least the review role of the courts is expanding. The 
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Community system is based on the rule of law; the actions taken by the state 
authorities are subject to the judicial control of the courts. National laws that 
are initiated by the executive and legislative should be in conformity with 
the Community law.     
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4. Conclusion: New Prospects in the Search of Direct Effect 
 
o much has been said in this paper, on the overlap between the 
conditions of direct effect and the existence of individual rights. In 
summary, it can be asserted from the above mentioned discussions that a 
Community provision may be sufficiently precise and unconditional as to be 
directly effective and may at the same time confer rights on individuals. 
However, that does not mean, whenever there is a directly effective 
provision at hand it naturally brings individual rights with it. The existence 
of individual rights and the acceptance of direct effect should not be 
equated. The direct effect doctrine itself is a very complex and diluted 
phrase. Therefore, adding a new condition to direct effect will make the 
existence of direct effect more difficult. As is well known, a directly 
effective Community provision may result in the creation of individual 
rights but this should only be considered as the consequence of it. There is 
no need to add a new condition to direct effect. The creation of rights as a 
result of the existence of direct effect is an issue which must be decided by 
national courts; thus, it is under the discretion of member-states. However, a 
national court may still ask the opinion of the ECJ on the interpretation of 
the case that seems to create individual rights. In fact, what makes a 
Community provision directly effective is whether the conditions of 
sufficient precision and unconditionality are satisfied. In general, there is no 
room for the creation of individual rights as a precondition. However, one 
can argue that even the necessity of conditions for direct effect is obsolete 
and an obstacle to the positive development of the Community law. 
Conditions seem to be restrictive regarding the development of Community 
law as a law of the land in the member-states.        
S 
Traditionally, the national courts have been left out of some fields 
including the foreign relations on the grounds of public security and public 
policy. The role of the courts is limited in those fields. However, it should 
also be stated that the role of the courts and the ECJ gains some importance 
when international relations involve a certain degree of individual rights. 
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The limits of the power of courts and their limited role in international 
relations has been determined from the very beginning of the international 
relations starting from the foundation of the nation-state. Admittedly as with 
many other concepts in international relations, the role of the courts has 
evolved and been modified lately. In particular, the unavoidable existence of 
the Community after two world wars, the changing relations in international 
conjuncture in general and increasing interdependencies in particular have 
added crucial developments to the constitutional position of the courts 
especially in the Community. Courts have become as influential as the 
governmental organs. While there is an eventual and positive development 
in the courts influence, the evolution of direct effect doctrine vis-à-vis the 
situation of the courts remains slower.  
 In the European Communities where the rule of law is enhanced, it is 
almost impossible to prevent the rise of the national courts and the ECJ, 
which have enormous powers to control not only the actions of state organs 
but also the national laws and the transposed Community provisions as well 
to ensure they are in conformity with the Community law. This right to 
review the legality of actions and the legality of national measures is to see 
whether they are compatible with the instructions and whether the 
obligations are the sole duty of both the national courts of the member-states 
and the ECJ. Actually, as Prechal (2000) indicates there is no need for such 
conditions in a system where rule of law reigns. Like the national courts in 
domestic legal systems, which have the duty and right to check the 
justiciability of the measures without any need for further conditions, the 
ECJ and the national courts of the member-states in the Community level, 
should also have the right to review the legality of the national measures and 
rely upon the Community provisions without questioning whether the 
concerned Community provision is directly effective, i.e. the provisions are 
sufficiently precise and unconditional.  
 The direct effect doctrine has a number of meanings that make the 
situation more complex. There are plenty of definitions regarding to the 
concept, ranging from direct effect to indirect effect, from subjective direct 
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effect to objective direct effect, from vertical direct effect to horizontal 
direct effect and finally from incidental direct effect to administrative direct 
effect, which seen identical but however are not same in their natures. In a 
community where the rule of law is embraced and where EC law has 
become the law of the land, the wide existence of a broad theory of direct 
effect and the necessity of its conditions is meaningless and can be 
considered as an obstacle to the development of the Community law.  
 Additionally, as Prechal points out in her 2000 study, the existence 
of direct effect doctrine underlines the “foreign origin” (1068) of the 
concept. In this regard, the existence of direct effect doctrine 
psychologically reminds the European minds that the Community law is 
coming from outside powers. In a Community where EC law is considered 
as the law of the land, this existence is inconvenient, if not unacceptable.  
 European sceptics and the hardcore realists must also be aware of the 
fact that when Community law reigns without direct effect doctrine—or at 
least where, for the direct effect of Community provisions there is no further 
need for sufficient precision and unconditionality—it will not bring the 
automatic application or transposition of the Community law into the 
domestic legal systems. On the contrary, the state organs will still execute 
the review of Community law, as if they review national measures in the 
light of public security or public policy. To put the matter differently, like 
national courts, which are not the sole sovereigns in every field at domestic 
level, the ECJ will not be the sole power in every field, and it will remain in 
its limits. The non-existence of direct effect will not result in the non-
existence of discretion of the executive or legislative. Therefore, the courts 
will still make the judicial review of the executive or legislative actions. 
There is no reason to hesitate since the non-existence of direct effect will 
not harm the nation-states but bring more uniformity to the Community 
where the rule of law reigns. 
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